I see this mini campaign as being something like a three day running battle. There are three turns per day, just using day light hours and infantry units can move 1 hex per turn.

Charles Grant's Programmed Wargame Scenarios book, has inspired the campaign framework, though I am using my own map, order-of-battle and order / response aspects.

As a fictional battle, the map has some made up names, plus a few borrowed from various ACW boardgame maps that I own, so it is a typical rather than actual representation.

The programmed part of the scenario means that some deployments, orders  and responses to enemy moves have been built into the campaign and these will be acted upon in a random way, by dice roll.

As an example, at the start of play a dice is rolled to determine the battle plan that the attacker will use, describing where the emphasis of attack will be and allocating forces accordingly.

By also randomising to a degree the defenders 'deployments' and 'responses',  the campaign should start to get a character of its own and feel fresh to my eyes despite all of my personal involvement with managing it. 

Work has started on two Orders-of-Battle, with the campaign being based around a division per side and the attacker having a 3:2 benefit in numbers. The defender will be dispersed around the map, so the immediate effect will be greater than 3:2 as the attackers meet various outposts and blocking forces etc.

The Shenandoah Valley 1862 campaign text has been dipped into to get an Order-of-Battle, though I am setting the Graysville campaign in 1863, not that it matters much except, using my own rules, units roll pre-battle (or pre-campaign in this case) on the Arming Table to see whether they get smoothbore or rifled muskets, so they will be using the 1863 column as rifling becomes much more common.

Against the odds! Only one unit gets armed with smoothbore musket, Elzey's 25th Virginia (Confederate).

Next, I rolled for brigade commander attributes. The Confederate commanders didn't get any, so they remain standard commanders, but for the Union, the dice went a little crazy.

Kimball has the Lucky attribute (so some re-rolls for him) as does 3rd Brigade's Tyrer. Colonel Sullivan was less fortunate and he rolled 'Exhausted'. This will bring him some command and control problems, so perhaps Shields might prefer not to give his brigade a leading role.

Some units have had to be described as 'small'. This is because Grant's programmed scenario book, makes use of smaller detatchments and refers to 5% of the force being given various responsibilities - usually outpost type positions and small units seems to be the best way to handle this sort of thing - we shall see!

I have knocked up myself a counter sheet to use with the map. It turns out I forgot to add another confederate cavalry unit (6th Virginia) so I made a separate counter for that.

I also included some 'Battle' counters. These are used to mark those enemy occupied hexes that a friendly unit / stack moves into, which will each needed to be gamed on the figures table for that turn. This is done as soon as an enemy hex is entered, units that enter that then enter the hex later in that same campaign turn, sit on top of the battle marker and will arrive on the tabletop battle as a reinforcement. 

And, so it begins!

It is Morning, 18th June 1863. Confederate, Major General Ewell has been ordered to the town of Graysville, which sits on a strategically important part of the road net. There he holds 1st Brigade under Colonel Scott in reserve, while his 2nd Brigade (Brigadier General Elzey) is dispersed further forward and has been deployed beyond Mott’s Run to cover the two approach roads and associated bridges. 1st Cavalry Brigade is deployed to cover the small ridge that overlooks Old Mine Road,

A Union division under Brigadier General Shields in approaching. His orders are to secure Graysville with all haste.

Having taken the inspiration for this campaign from Charles Grant’s book ‘Programmed Wargame Scenarios’, Orders have been given to the units of both sides, but equally importantly, each location occupied by a confederate force has been given some dice driven options that they will test against in response to any hostile action.

What this means is that, for example, as Dowdall Church is attacked, the occupying 31st Virginia regiment located there will dice against a number of pre-determined potential response. So until that happens, we will not know how 31st will respond. Mostly the responses are weighted towards a certain decision, but who knows what the dice will give us.

Likewise, I have set up some variables for the Union attack. At the start of play, a D6 will determine how Shields will deploy and direct his division. So the first thing we must do is to determine that. Let’s work out Shield’s initial plan now!

Roll a D6 …… 2, that result says;

1st & 2nd Brigade, plus Battery H push down the Old Mine Road. 1st Brigade will clear Peavine Ridge and 2nd Brigade with the artillery will push on along the road to seize Duffy’s Mill (Remember 2nd Brigade commandet - Colonel Sullivan, is suffering from exhaustion).

3rd Brigade will advance directly down Piney Turnpike to capture Rock Spring, while Colonel Brodhead will take his two cavalry regiments to secure Dowdall Church.

These manoeuvres are a pre-cursor to the union taking the bridges across Mott’s Run and advancing onto Graysville.

Next, we shall see  the Union advance onto the map and see how the forward confederate elements respond to the ‘sea of blue’! No doubt a relay of messages and orders will quickly follow.

Brodhead's two cavalry regiments (1st Ohio and 1st Michigan) moved onto Dowdall Church, which was defended by 31st Virginia (classed as a small regiment).

The cavalrymen dismounted and moved within carbine range, taking a volley of fire for their troubles.

Their return fire was rather effective and 31st were quite discomforted by their casualties.

[Checking on the 31st's responses and rolling a D6, it was determined that the Virginians would stand and fight until they took their first casualties and then withdraw, intending to fall back on Rocky Spring].

Accordingly, after taking losses, the 31st successfully disengaged, though pursued by the cavalrymen who remained  on foot.

The Union had gained their first objective (1 VP) which in truth was no more than a skirmish.

The 31st Virginia scouts had managed to properly identify that their wing was facing an infantry brigade, with cavalry and gun support. They sent messengers to Elzey to that effect.

However, over on the right, 25th Virginia on the ridge could only see a single union infantry brigade. They had yet to see the other infantry brigade with its artillery and so their messengers to Elzey only advised of the nearest infantry brigade.

At Elzey's headquarters, the arrival of those messages suggested that the union main effort was going to be on the Confederate left, down Piney Turnpike - were the confederates about to be wrong-footed!

Elzey dispatched fast riders to Ewell at Graysville, via Rocky Spring Bridge, advising that the union were advancing down both roads, with the main effort seemingly being on the Piney Turnpike.

He also dashed off a quick message to Colonel Munford (1st Cavalry Brigade), who was over on Peavine Ridge, asking for support at Piney Turnpike, to deal with the enemy cavalry. 

Munford however had an emerging problem on his own doorstep. The union 1st Infantry Brigade had just started their assault on the eastern end of Peavine Ridge, the part of the high ground defended by 25th Virginia Infantry Regiment. Munford’s own position was now increasingly linked to whatever unfolded further down the ridge.

At Dowdall Church, 1st Ohio Cavalry had requested permission from Brodhead to pursue the retreating 31st Virginia Infantry, but Brodhead refused [failed initiative die!] preferring to await further instruction from Shields.

[As it happens, orders were already on the way from Shields, directing Brodhead that his cavalry should bypass Rock Spring and secure Rock Spring Bridge].

Kimball (Union - 1st Infantry Brigade) took 14th Indiana, 8th Ohio and 67th Ohio into action against 25th Virginia on Peavine Ridge. Known as ‘Lucky Kimball’ he held his line back and opened fire at long range, with decent results [thanks to a Kimball 'lucky' re-roll]. The 25th, being smoothbore armed were too far away at this point to offer effective return fire.

[in any case, a test on the Response Table required 25th Virginia to immediately abandon their position and retire to Duffy’s Mill].

25th Virginia were easily able to disengage, limping away [with 2 hits] and disappearing from union view as they descended the rear slopes of the ridge.

They were surprised to see 13th Virginia advancing towards them. They had been positioned at the mill, but had marched to the sound of guns [following a Response Test].

With three union regiments on their tail, both 13th and 25th fell back on Duffy’s Mill and set about creating some barricades.

Orders and messages were criss-crossing the district. Brodhead’s union cavalry received Shields orders to move and bypass Rock Spring and capture the bridge.

News had reached Ewell’s headquarters at Graysville that the enemy main thrust was coming down Piney Turnpike. He was with Scott and ordered him to march with 1st Infantry Brigade and respond to the threat against the two bridges, with two infantry regiments to be sent to Rock Spring Bridge and one regiment to move up to the Old Mine Road bridge and that both bridge positions should be held for as long as possible.

In addition, Scott ordered his artillery (Lusk), presently on Laurel Hill, to move upstream and support the infantry at Rock Spring Bridge. Ewell moved his headquarters further forward to Laurel Hill.

25th Virginia were now seeing a second Infantry Brigade with their artillery appear on Old Mine Road and immediately alerted Elzey about these additional troops advancing towards Duffy’s Mill. Elzey, realising the extent of the danger emerging on his right, got word off to Ewell urgently.

The Fighting.

Having earlier cleared 25th Virginia from the eastern end of Peavine Ridge, Kimball pressed on to clear the rest of the feature, held by Mumfords cavalry brigade of two regiments, which had taken up skirmishing positions amongst the difficult terrain (see poto above).

Kimball decided that his men would rush at the cavalrymen to get amongst them as quickly as possible, but as he approached, they mounted up and fell back some distance. Confident that the cavalry were not committed to defending the ground, he again rushed forward, his lines becoming increasingly disordered in the difficult terrain.

Munford was vexed at what to do for the best, he could easily have the brigade mount up and pull out, keeping his force relatively unscathed, but he did not want to abandon the hill so readily. In the end through a combination of bravery and stubbornness, the cavalry stood their ground and delivered rapid fire …. would they be swept away by the union charge?

Munford’s volleys did a lot of damage and the Union line hesitated and then quickly retired - beaten off, for now. Kimball’s attack had failed.

[When I say Munford was vexed, it was of course I who was torn between standing and retreating. Had the Union got amongst the cavalrymen, Munford’s men would have suffered greatly, so really standing firm was something of a gamble, but they did it and it paid off]

The Union’s 14th Indiana and 67th Ohio had sustained heavy casualties. With the offensive capability of both regiments curtailed - would Kimball renew the attack? Regardless, with Kimball now tied up with Munford, the cavalrymen’s actions had likely saved the confederate soldiers at Duffy’s Mill, from having to face off against two fresh Union infantry brigades.

[Munford’s brigade had not taken enough losses for their programmed retreat orders to kick in, so the cavalry stood their ground and waited!] 

Shields sent instructions to Brodhead to bring the Cavalry to Peavine Ridge and co-ordinate an attack with Kimbell once he arrived, which would not be until later in the afternoon.

Munford was becoming increasingly concerned about being isolated on the wrong side of Mott’s Run. His scouts had noted the approach of Brodhead’s cavalry and seeing encirclement as a real risk, Munford decided to ride out and engage the approaching Brodhead in an effort to break out.

[note - Munford passed an Initiative Test to allow him to override his orders].

On the Old Mine Road, Sullivan’s 2nd Brigade had reached Duffy’s Mill, which was defended by 13th and 25th Virginia. He attacked.

Elzey now being aware of the additional infantry brigade advancing on Duffy’s Mill, sent riders to advise Ewell of this additional threat to the right. Ewell was in fact only just becoming aware of the Munford’s cavalry action at Peavine Ridge the previous day.

Munford’s Action;

This was as brief as it was dynamic! The two cavalry forces of equal size, struck each other in an area of open farmland and a swirling cavalry action ensued with devastating consequences for the confederates.

6th Virginia, facing 1st Ohio, were roughly handled, taking many losses. They retreated, but were pursued, taking further loss and then routing from the field, leaving them unfit for further meaningful involvement in the campaign.

Munford was over with 2nd Virginia on the left wing. They managed to fight off 1st Michigan, but in the clash, Munford fell from the saddle, killed by a pistol shot to the throat. Colonel Ashby stepped up to take command of the brigade and immediately ordered a full retreat. The confederate cavalry brigade had suffered a telling defeat.

Sullivan’s Action;

At Duffy’s Mill, the smoothbore armed 25th Virgina had built a barricade across the road, giving them an excellent blocking position, while 13th Virginia in skirmish order, lined a nearby field, giving them a flanking position against any union troops that assaulted the barricade position.

Though a well executed trap, with a full fresh union brigade and their artillery, moving determinedly towards them, the confederates did not in truth, fancy their chances today. However, the union brigade commander was suffering from exhaustion and his command group were worried whether he was up for this fight.

Sullivan gave his main attention to the barricade, attacking before his guns had chance to take up firing positions. The lead regiment, 5th Ohio [superior] took heavy casualties on their approach.

A shot from a Virginian marksman instantly killed Sullivan and for a moment the brigade wavered and became disordered as 13th and 39th Illinois turned from attacking the barricade to give their attention to the flanking 13th Virginia, in the field, which was now delivering effective fire.

Colonel Francis Pond assumed command of the brigade and managed to restore good order, but by this time, the lone 5th Ohio had suffered grievously in front on the barricade.

Arguably, the confederates might at this point have held their ground, but with the Union artillery now joining the fray and confederate casualties mounting, they decided to pull back and retire towards the bridge.

The Union had gained Duffy’s Mill, but at the cost of their best unit, 5th Ohio becoming ‘unsteady’.

The above graphic shows Kimbell (circled) standing still, preparing for an afternoon assault along the ridge, the direction of Munford’s cavalry attack / subsequent retreat and the assault at Duffy’s Mill by Sullivan. 

Losses to date;

Union - 180 rank & file. Leaders, Sullivan

Confederate - 150 rank & file. Leaders Munford

Ewell was only now becoming aware that a second brigade had joined the Union advance down the Old Mine Road. He immediately recalled Lusk, ordering him to bring his artillery back to Laurel Hill.

The Union were keen to keep up the momentum of advance before the confederates could react. Pond’s 2nd Brigade attacked the bridge crossing Mott’s Run on the Old Mine Road. Kimbell was following behind, though they had sent 14th Indiana off to fully secure Peavine Ridge.

On the Piney Turnpike, Tyler with his 3rd Brigade attacked Rock Spring.

Ewell felt that the bridges presented the last opportunity to hold the Union advance and that if either or both of the bridges fell into union hands, the important junction at Graysville itself would be difficult to hold. Accepting that he had not yet managed to concentrate his regiments, he thought it likely that the bridges would be lost at some point today and he was already resigned to the prospect of fighting on his side of Mott’s Run.

The speed of the union advance has caught General Brigadier Elzby by surprise. Likewise, Ashby’s cavalry had stayed forwards for too long and now looked like they might be cut-off from Ewell. Brodhead’s cavalry had pursued and caught up with Ashby’s 2nd Virginian cavalry.

The Union attack at the bridge on the Old Mine Road.

Pond decide to keep 5th Ohio out of the battle due to the heavy mauling that it had suffered that morning at Duffy’s Mill. He did have the advantage of artillery, but that aside, Shields’ insistence that Pond should keep up the momentum of advance, did come with some risks.

However, the confederate defenders were not confident. 39th Illinois charged over the bridge and easily pushed 25th Virginia back. The 25th halted to stand and give a volley, but the return fire from the 39th was devastating [4 hits on 4 dice!] and 25th Virginia with grievous casualties, fled the field.

Elzey, commander of 2nd Brigade (confederate) and his headquarters entourage had been racing through the woods to reach the bridge, fearing he would become cut-off from his brigade - but he was too late, the bridge had already fallen and Elzey found himself surrendering to Pond!

[note - 25th Virginia are wrecked and no longer capable of contributing to the campaign]. 

The Union attack at Rock Spring

Having sent 44th Virginia and 1st Maryland from 1st Brigade to reinforce Rock Spring, Scott the commander of 1st Brigade was aware that they would not reach Rock Spring in time to help 31st Virginia and 12th Georgia. 

Suspecting that Rock Spring would be overwhelmed by Tyrer’s fresh union brigade, Scott issued new orders. His reinforcing regiments should halt at the bridge and defend it with determination. He sent messengers to Rock Spring to advise 31st and 12th (both from Elzey's 2nd Brigade) of this and suggested that they should abandon Rock Spring and fall back onto the bridge to unite with his force there.

At Rock Spring, 31st and 12th had been out of contact with their brigade commander (Elzey) for some hours. Needing to act upon Scott’s update, Brigadier General Isaac Trimble, who was present, appointed himself as temporary brigade commander. He ordered both regiments to break contact from the approaching union forces and fall back.

Union round shot had already started to find its mark, causing casualties and consternation amongst 12th Georgia, who had many raw recruits and they needed little persuasion to skedaddle! The confederates abandoned Rock Spring and made for the bridge, taking around 30 casualties from union guns.

On this part of the battlefield, the confederates were certainly feeling exposed by their own lack of artillery to counter the enemy’s guns - a situation that was bound to persist, now that Lusk’s artillery had been recalled to Laurel Hill.

The Pursuit of Ashby’s cavalry

Ashby’s 2nd Virginia cavalry had been pursued by Brodhead’s 1st Ohio and 1st Michigan’s cavalry. 1st Michigan was in pretty poor shape, so they allowed themselves to be screened by 1st Ohio, simply supporting them when needed.

Ashby made a feigned retreat [Random Event], then turned and charged his pursuers. Brodhead was totally caught on the hop [failed his Capability Test!], but frustratingly, Ashby’s charge was ineffective [just a bad dice thing - a shame - this could have been an interesting moment].

The delay in Brodhead’s response allowed Ashby to get away and seek the cover of the light woods along Brook Trail.

Situation

The boldness of the union advance meant that the confederates had not had a chance to concentrate either of their brigades, which was allowing the union to dismantle the confederate positions in piecemeal fashion. Where there had been fighting, the dice, combined with a couple of very fortuitous Random Events, though giving a good story, had been broadly unkind to the confederates.

Holding or at least delaying the union at Mott’s Run was a prime confederate objective - but that was already a fading hope.

Of note, some of the units that had been in combat since the previous day, were showing some signs of exhaustion - having enough fresh troops on hand to feed into the action might become a deciding factor over the next 12 hours.

The Late Evening report will be added soon.